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A B S T R A C T
Science, technology and policy are today entangled in concurrent crises, rapid transformations
and conflicts, which are alimented by an ever-accelerating media system. Existing attempts to
capture separate elements of crisis miss their structural coupling, and are hence ineffective. The
crisis has elements of inevitability linked to our addiction to technology and communication.
Using elementary concepts from social system theory, and reconnecting them to a long in-
tellectual tradition of critique of technoscience, we argue that the relation between science and
technoscience is where the analysis should start. Science’s epistemic authority is simultaneously
challenged and brought to bear of topics where it deeply interacts with technology and society, as
we show by taking the vaccine controversy as a test case.
“I am, like most other critics, armed
less with solutions than with problems”
Neil Postman (Postman, 1992).
1. Introduction
Nexus or vortex?
The concept of a critical interface between science, technology and policy was formulated by Giandomenico Majone in 1989
(Majone, 1989) in the context of use of arguments in the policy process. At the present moment this interface appears to have eaten
up into the surrounding space, filling it up. All that takes place today in our societies and is significant to our human condition has to
do simultaneously with science, technology and policy. Many of authors – from Jaron Lanier to Yuval Harari, from Elijah Millgram to
Michael P. Lynch to mention just a few, would appear to concur to this vision and to the sense of urgency it conveys, variously
detecting threats to democratic representation, dangers from platform or surveillance capitalism, yet new runaway technologies, or
crisis in the governance of the science system. Our attempt is to show how all these elements are tightly coupled, in a nexus to which
the media system impulses an unprecedented acceleration – hence the vortex in the title. We shall look at some important drivers of
the present state of affairs, such as our addiction to technology and to communication. Then we shall briefly discuss to what extent all
this is a new world, versus an old world in new clothes. Finally, we shall use social system theory to better characterize the relation
between technoscience, policy and the new media, taking the vaccine controversy as a worked example.
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2. Technology and communication as human destiny
The broken dream of a baby boomer. Communication as our destiny. Technology, capital and media
For social system theory and in particular for German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, our present society is functionally differ-
entiated in systems such as law, science, the economy, the media, and politics. This differentiation is what distinguishes our mod-
ernity from the previous stratified social structure, whereby each individual had a role assigned at birth. In a functionally differ-
entiated society individuals inhabit and function in a plurality of systems: “Nobody can live in only one of these [functionally
differentiated] systems”. Here different generalized symbolic media, such as money (for the economy), power (for politics) and truth
(for science) allow the simplification of the complexity of our lives, while simultaneously expediting transactions and communica-
tions (Moeller, 2006). Love as passion is itself, for Luhmann, a generalized symbolic medium of communication permitting enhanced
levels of intimacy and communication (Luhmann, 1998). If science is mediatized (Scheufele, 2014), commoditized (Mirowski, 2011)
and politicized (Pielke, 2007) – even in its manifestation of internal crisis (Saltelli, 2018, 2019), this would be interpreted in social
system theory as the structural coupling between different systems, the capacity of these systems to ‘irritate’ and ‘resonate with’ one
another, and finally the capacity of one system to grow at the expenses of others. The communication between systems takes place in
a situation of ‘double contingency’, where each system makes sense of the other only in relation to its own code and programme, and
forms an image of the other again as a function of its own code. There is no neutral ground where the two system can communicate.
Social system theory describes the cultural evolution of human society as progressing toward more and richer differentiation and
symbolic media of communication. Aristotle saw man as a ‘social animal’, while in our times Yuval Harari sees Homo Sapiens as a
chimpanzee with the added capacity to communicate and share common ‘stories’, which allows the formation of groups of increased
numerosity and internal differentiation (Harari, 2015). Luhmann’s theory of a functionally differentiated society engaged in ever
more sophisticated generalized symbolic media of communication extends and radicalizes this vision.
Where does this lead us in relation to the problems of media and technoscience? An example will help. A few years ago, a
technical magazine devoted its cover to the image of a baby boomer protesting; “You promised me Mars colonies. Instead, I got
Facebook” (Coverpage, 2012). At a superficial reading, one might imagine that the present trajectory is just an accident of tech-
nology; in a parallel universe, perhaps, the human race is already on Mars without Facebook. What if this trajectory had a reason? For
the fathers of the ecological movement humans are compulsive adopters of technology, and this is already a good indication of our
fate, since we can more easily adopt a system like Facebook than we can adopt a piece of the space program. But what if we are - by
result of our evolution, compulsive adopters of more and better strategies, forms and media of communication as per social system
theory? (Moeller, 2006). If we accept Harari’s thesis that humans are communicating chimpanzees (Harari, 2015), then we can
interpret the role of social media as making humans’ shared stories simultaneously more shared and more fragmented. While the
synergetic coupling of technology with capital was already noted by Lewis Mumford (Mumford, 1934) in the thirties, the present
coupling in the form of platform (Lanier, 2006) or surveillance (Zuboff, 2019) capitalism gives the story a new twist, an acceleration,
whereby technology, capital and media become entangled, and contribute to the common core of the different crises of technoscience
and political representation.
3. Old or new?
Are we witnessing something new or just old problems in new clothes? Harold Innis’take. Convergence science is here. Trust in Science and
trust in social order
At the present junction the ever-communicating humans – addicted to technology and exposed to an increased mediatisation of all
spheres of life, find themselves in the so-called post-truth era – an unfortunate expression as it assumes a ‘truth-era’ which somehow
went missing. It is easy to say that this is an old story in a new format, but is this the case? For example, the Twitter hashtag
#jewsdid911 is practiced by a community attributing the 9/11 terroristic attack to a Jewish conspiracy. One could say that there is
nothing new here, offering as precedent the forgery of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, or the many theories used to justify
pogroms. The difference is that the present technology makes the hashtag universal: it can be read in every part of the planet, is
instantly updatable with new content, and – if desired – automated (Harari, 2018), to the extent that automatic algorithms can be, –
and actually are, generated to engage humans around the subject in order to stoke hatred and division (Lanier, 2018). Is this just a
new format or a new world?
For Harold Adams Innis a society's communication media and the manner its culture develops are entangled (Innis, 1991).
Typically, media which travel well in time and less well in space (clay or stones) underpin different cultures than media which travel
well in space and less well in time (papyruses).
We can perhaps assume that the use of a medium of communication over a long period will to some extent determine the character of
knowledge to be communicated and suggest that its pervasive influence will eventually create a civilization in which life and flexibility will
become exceedingly difficult to maintain and that the advantages of a new medium will become such as to lead to the emergence of a new
civilization.
(Innis, 1991). Innis would probably see in our new media dominated present the making of a new world. Of course, a rich cohort
of scholars would subscribe to the New World paradigm. For Luhmann (King & Schütz, 1994):
The society that we observe today is no longer that of Marx, Weber or Durkheim. And even more so, it is not that of the Enlightenment or
the French revolution. More than ever before, the past has lost its binding force and this is also true in regard to the value criteria which
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once formed the basis for the search for rationality.
Likewise for the other great German sociologist Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1992) with his reflexive modernity marking a separation to a
new phase.
What role does science play in the new configuration? The chains of transmission between science and technology on the one
hand, and policy and society on the other have multiplied; mathematical models, artificial intelligence, nano and bio technologies do
impact everyday life and behaviours via channels such as algorithms for the social media and the financial system, possibility of
human enhancements, genetically modified food, pesticides, robotics, autonomous vehicles, geoengineering, new weapon systems
and many others. The ‘convergence science’ based on the ‘nano-bio-info-cogno’ (where ‘cogno’ stands for cognitive sciences) para-
digm is hailed by the National Science Foundation as opening the doors to the solution of “vexing research problems, in particular,
complex problems focusing on societal needs” (The National Science Foundation, 2016).
While permeating our collective lives, science is at the same time a source of legitimacy for the modern state. “Solutions to the
problem of knowledge are solutions to the problem of social order […] Trust in Science and trust in the prevailing social order are
linked” for Shapin and Schaffer (Shapin & Schaffer, 2011).
Trust in the form of ‘system trust’, is a fundamental ingredient of social system theory:
The reduction of complexity [made possible by generalized media of communication as money, power and truth] assumes trust on the part
of those who are expecting such reduction and of those who are supposed to accept it once it is accomplished. [System trust thus permits]
the bank to lend more money than it possess, the state to issue more commands than it can enforce using the police, that more information is
divulged in professional advice than could be backed up empirically or logically.
(Luhmann, 2017). For Jerome Ravetz (Ravetz, 1971) science is made possible by an ‘essential fiduciary status’: trust in science is
necessary for the general society to continue to support it, materially and with recruits; and mutual trust within science is necessary
for its systems of quality assurance to function. In relation to the subject of the present work it can be noted that Jerome R. Ravetz has
interpreted change in our relation with technoscience as the result of the maturing of structural contradictions (Ravetz, 2011). As per
science’s own crisis of quality control Ravetz has offered an original reading in terms of the social nature of the scientific activity,
whereby the quality control arrangements in place when science was little become inadequate when science is big, or mega (Ravetz,
1971, 2011). The inadequacy manifests itself in a mismatch between ideals and incentives in research practices, the impossibility to
catch up with bad science, and a systematic misdiagnosis of the present crisis (Ravetz, 1971; Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2017).
4. Technoscience and policy
The end of a grand narrative?
The relation of science and technology has a long history and tradition. Jean-François Lyotard and Bruno Latour used the term
techno-science to indicate that the arrow of causality doesn’t simply flow from science to technology (Latour, 1987), but that these
systems coevolve. Likewise for the relation between technoscience and the economy – capitalism to be precise, in the thought of
Lewis Mumford, one of the fathers of the ecological movement (Mumford, 1934). Technoscience as engine of growth, generally
equated with progress, was central to the post-modern critique, whereby the main narrative of science as a vehicle for personal
maturing (Bildung) and emancipation (Lyotard, 1979) would have by now run its course.
This tradition of critique becomes all the more cogent today. Science – whose so called reproducibility crisis is only a small piece
of the puzzle (Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2017) - is at the core of important trajectories which are shaking our collective life (Harari, 2018;
Lanier, 2006). In this reading, science’s crisis cannot be separated from the crisis of trust in expertise, from our apparent inability to
control technology, and from the insurgence of demagogic or authoritarian movements within mature democracies.
To analyse this, we focus on the couplings between technoscience, politics, economy and society at large as made possible by the
new media.
5. Technoscience, science and technology
Technoscience as a separate functional system
First of all, it is necessary to be clear about the differences between science, technoscience and technology. To do so, we will look
at them not as epistemologists, nor as philosophers of science, let alone as moralists, but as sociologists, precisely as system-oriented
sociologists. As mentioned above, social systems theory has highlighted the functionally differentiated character of modern society. It
contends that the functional systems have all their communications shaped by a binary code: true/untrue for the scientific system;
payment/non-payment for the economy; government/opposition for policy; information (i.e. new)/non information (i.e. old) for
mass media; legal/illegal for law, etc.
The binary code is what allows systems to distinguish themselves from their environment and to connect recursively their
communications in an autopoietic manner. Modern society is a heterarchy, not a hierarchy. There is no overarching system and no
system – not even the State – can speak in the name of another one. Indeed, only science can communicate about the world in terms of
truthfulness/falsity, Law in terms of lawfulness/illegality, and so on. However, in order to select the right side of the distinction, they
make use of programs, such as for science, theories and methods, which, contrary to the code, can change and evolve. As long as
science will remain science, its binary code will not change, contrary to its theories and methods. So, we have now a sociological
definition of science as that social functional system which has the monopole of distinguishing (even if provisionally) between true
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and false statements about the world (nature, the individual and society).
What about technoscience? There has been a lot of attempts to get by a convincing definition of technoscience (Raynaud, 2015).
We propose the following: technoscience is the system of communication using the same theories and methods of science (its pro-
grams) but which is driven by the binary code “work/doesn’t work”. We follow on this (Luhmann, 1990). While science is concerned
with statements about the actual (even if past or future), technoscience is concerned with the virtual, what could exist and how to
make it exist. Because it uses the same language than science, one could say that technoscience behaves like the cuckoo who lay its
eggs in others’ bird nests. Finally, as for technologies, they are eco-systems (or networks) of techniques linked by relations of
complementarity and co-operation.
6. Structural couplings between functional systems
Crises ‘in’ versus crises ‘of’ a system
The execution of functional programs necessitates resources supplied by the social environment. Therefore, every functional
system is dependent on the others. The political system needs (growing) financial resources for satisfying (ever growing) demands
from the other systems. The economy needs laws to ensure that contracts are being honoured or that sanctions are applied; all systems
need competent individuals able to execute their programs and they expect the education system to provide them. And all need the
mass media because “Whatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world we live in, we know through the mass media”
(Luhmann, 1996). These kinds of linkages between systems are called “structural couplings”. It is through these structural couplings
that systems can transfer their internal crisis to others systems, or conversely, become destabilised by crisis affecting the others
societal systems. The problem of crisis of functional differentiation can be analysed in term of loose versus tight couplings
Medialization or politicization designates the fact that the couplings between science and the media or the politics have gotten too
tight, seemingly blurring the distinction between the different subsystems. However,
“It has become fashionable to speak of a ‘blurring of the boundaries’ or of ‘hybridisation’. This is misleading as it incorrectly suggests that
the functional differentiation between science and politics disappears. The novel aspect of the use of scientific expertise is the close coupling
of science and politics. This coupling is dynamic in the sense that it is driven from both sides to become ever closer.”
(Weingart, 1999). Structural coupling obtains at the level of structures, not at the code level. This is why Luhmann, following
biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, insists that structural couplings are orthogonal to autopoiesis, because au-
topoiesis refers to the property of systems of making/reproducing themselves using strictly only their communication code (e.g. law
can only act and communicate in terms of law; simultaneously only law can say what is lawful / unlawful), while the structural
couplings take place at the outer level of programs and interaction with the social environment.
It may be useful to distinguish between a crisis “in” a societal system” and a crisis “of” a societal system. An internal crisis is
characterized by a discrepancy between the system’s binary code and its programme, the latter being less and less up to the binary
coding requirements. For science, an internal crisis would mean that its methods and theories have become incapable to discriminate
between true and false statements or that what was beforehand accepted as true or false has become indeterminate. The end of the
crisis goes generally by what Thomas Kuhn has called a paradigm change (Kuhn, 1962). It is to be noted that in the internal crisis,
there is no questioning of the validity of the code itself. On the contrary, it is the system itself which is in crisis when its binary code
and its constitutive symbols are questioned to the point of being gradually replaced by others symbols and codes, as, for instance,
when the code new/old (mass media), property/non property (economy) or power/non-power (politics) gains prominence at the
expense of the code true/false in scientific communications. Major subversions of this nature are generally associated to a growing
loss in trust in the symbols and signs of value of the system in crisis, a phenomenon equivalent to the processes of inflation and
deflation in the economy. As shown by A. Béjin (Béjin, 1976), all societal systems are backed up by a fiduciary basis, pledges and
guarantors that ensure that they remain trustworthy. A crisis consists of a discredit of the signs of values, an erosion of the fiduciary
basis and a regression to the pledges, which amounts to a loss of internal complexity, a drastic simplification. In economics, for
instance, it is a regression to gold (or land) as refuge value. In the scientific field, it is the reproducibility of experiments and
calculations that underpins the trust placed in the signs of truth. The core of certainty of fundamental evidence supports this trust,
which is also supported by scientific institutions as they exercise a control function (symbolic violence) on the validity of statements
within their competence. A crisis in reproducibility is therefore likely to threaten the whole system, notably because it demonstrates
the inability of the guarantors to protect the basis of trust. Likewise, (Weingart, 1999) speaks of the “inflationary use of scientific
expertise”. This begs the question of what constitutes the regression to the pledge in science … should one say neo-positivism?
It can be argued that the problems encountered by what we have called “the nexus” are not new (Fuchs & Westervelt, 1996) and
that they are with us from long ago without having impeded significantly the functioning of society. But today, there is something
totally new: it is the pressure exerted by the social media on the three systems: the media, politics and science. The argument, in two
words, is the following: the three “classical” systems are “irritated” by the enormous flow of communication coming from the social
media and they are, for the moment, unable to make sense of it with their own codes and programs. The case of vaccination will
illustrate this: Internet and the social networks have become media of a global social communicational conflict “vaccination/anti-
vaccination”, which is freeriding as a parasite of the global and national health systems.
7. The vaccine confidence gap
Vaccines in the vortex
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15 APRIL 2019, GENEVA - Measles cases have continued to climb into 2019. Preliminary global data shows that reported cases rose by
300 percent in the first three months of 2019, compared to the same period in 2018. This follows consecutive increases over the past two
years.
While this data is provisional and not yet complete, it indicates a clear trend. …
Measles is one of the world’s most contagious diseases, with the potential to be extremely severe. In 2017, the most recent year for which
estimates are available, it caused close to 110 000 deaths…
The disease is almost entirely preventable through two doses of a safe and effective vaccine. For several years, however, global coverage
with the first dose of measles vaccine has stalled at 85 percent. This is still short of the 95 percent needed to prevent outbreaks, and leaves
many people, in many communities, at risk. Second dose coverage, while increasing, stands at 67 percent.
This alarming quote is from a recent note of the World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 2019).
The steady decline in vaccination coverage (from 95 % in 1997 to 80 % in 2004) started around 1998 and is the outcome of
perverse couplings between the systems of health, politics, media, science, the economy, where even religion is involved.
For the readers unfamiliar with the case, we recall that in 1998 the very important and highly rated medical journal “The Lancet”
published an article authored by Andrew Wakefield and thirteen others researchers arguing that the triple vaccine against measles,
mumps and rubella (MMR) could be associated to the development of autism in vaccinated children. Though the “evidence” provided
was coming from only eight children amongst twelve examined, the article “inflamed an already existing debate on the role of
childhood vaccination in the UK and contributed to a substantial decline in vaccination uptake in the UK in the early 2000. The
impact was still being felt in 2012 and 2013” (Stöckl & Smajdor, 2017 p.239).
Simultaneously, concerns with the role that Thiomersal (also known as Thimerosal), a compound containing ethylmercury, could
play in autism were rising in the US and triggered an anti-vaccination movement that is also still active today.
The MMR controversy is particularly interesting because it started from a scientific paper followed by a press conference held
soon after its publication so that the media had been alerted very early. This started a debate that continued long after the in-
formation had been proved to be false and the article retracted – albeit tardively, from “The Lancet” in 2010. According to a journalist
(Brian Deer, of the Sunday Times) Wakefield would have been paid 400,000 pounds by lawyers seeking to prove that the vaccine was
unsafe (Kasik, 2012).
The problem of acceptance by the population of government’s vaccination schedules offers an exceptionally revealing view of
what we mean here by the “nexus”. Almost all the functional systems have a stake in the way vaccines and vaccination campaigns are
perceived and accepted or not by the public.
First of all, of course, the health system both at the international level with the WHO and at the national one with the different
national health services and administrations, whose communications on the benefits of vaccination “irritate” governments and the
political system in general. Since vaccination is effective only if a significant proportion of the population is covered, it is considered
necessary to overcome the possible free riding behaviour of some by rending vaccination mandatory, for instance for all babies
between 9 and 12 months. Vaccinations schedules are therefore “collectively binding decisions”. The economy is also structurally
coupled to the health system. Vaccines are a big business. As noted in The Lancet:
In the past decade, the global vaccine industry has mushroomed in terms of the number of companies involved and products in development.
From 1995 to 2008, the number of vaccine companies that sought to create or manufacture vaccines doubled to 136, as did the number of
prophylactic vaccine products in development to 354. The list of WHO prequalified vaccines now has 202 products from different
manufacturers targeted against 20 infectious agents, and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) list of vaccines available for
immunization in the USA consists of 72 products.
(Larson, Cooper, Eskola, Katz, & Ratzan, 2011). According to (Global Market Insights, 2019b) the vaccines market is estimated to
rise from the present (2018) value of $38 billion to over $70 billion by 2025.
Among the major companies involved in the global vaccines industry are “Merck & Co., Abbott, AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Astellas Pharma, Sanofi Pasteur, Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Emergent BioSolutions, Novartis, Novavax and CSL” (Global
Market Insights, 2019a). These companies associated with academic laboratories are the main actors in the technoscientific activity
of vaccine creation or development.
The law system is also involved. As Anna Kirkland explains: “Vaccines injuries display the inevitability of the meeting between
science, politics, and the law, giving us a case to explore how well our democracy manages this tense and productive collaboration”
(Kirkland, 2016). In the USA, a “vaccine court” has been established, “a useful institution for handling the recognition of vaccine
injuries given that we regard them as posing simultaneously scientific, political, ethical, and legal problems.” (Kirkland, 2016).
As we have seen, the “classical” media have played and still play an important role in nurturing a debate that is or should be
considered as closed by the scientists and the health system administrators. This has in part to do with the “norm of balance” for
journalists. This norm stipulates that “… journalists present all sides of an issue (including all relevant information and stakeholder
perspectives) in an objective manner” (Clarke, 2008).
It is doubtful that this standard of balance really corresponds to objective information when it comes to equating the over-
whelming majority of scientists and a few isolated researchers. This reminds of the famous recipe for the meat pie fifty-fifty horse and
lark: mix the flesh of one horse with that of one lark.
This unfortunate recipe has been deployed in full in the Vaccine-autism issue (Clarke, 2008); in a sample of 279 articles in the UK
and USA press between 1998 and 2006, where the words “vaccine” and “autism” appeared, 31 % presented both pro and anti-link
(between vaccination and autism) positions, 27 % didn’t discuss the link issue at all, 18 % presented only anti-link information and 24
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% only pro-link arguments. Moreover the British press devoted considerable attention to pro-link studies and claims, especially
during periods of increased coverage in 2001–2002 and 2004 – a time when the scientific consensus on an autism-vaccine link
strengthened, rather that weakened. This is not so surprising viewed from a Luhmannian perspective. The autopoiesis of the mass
media system is driven by the information/non-information binary code, which amounts to the new (buzz)/old (not buzz) distinction.
Information has been characterized by Gregory Bateson as “a difference that makes a difference” (Bateson, 1972) and an isolated
voice that preaches the opposite of what thousands of unanimous voices preach is a difference that makes a difference from an
informational point of view. In general, observes Luhmann (Luhmann, 1996 p.28), the mass media privilege the dissensus over the
consensus, local relevance over global one and individual events rather than general trends and processes:
Conflicts are preferred. As topics, conflicts have the benefit of alluding to a self-induced uncertainty. They put off the liberating information
about winners and losers by way of reference to a future. This generates tension and, on the side of understanding the communication,
guesswork.
Therefore, even an honestly balanced coverage ends up favouring minority point of view.
Media attempts to balance coverage by provision of equal opportunity to all viewpoints exacerbates the challenges to public confidence in
vaccines by allowing outlier views and small extremist opinions the same media space as views validated through a rigorous process of peer
review by the scientific community.
(Larson et al., 2011). Of course, the new media have also played (and continue to play) a significant role in the emergence and
growth of anti-vaccination communities. The algorithm at the core of Facebook, for instance, is a powerful self-referential engine
where the “likes” and “dislikes” (or “share” or “re-tweet”) constitute positive and negative feedbacks communications that contribute
to the constitution of homogeneous, uniform communities of discourses. No wonder that an article published in the “Vaccine” journal
call the internet the “postmodern pandora’s box” (Kata, 2010), following a formulation of (Mayer & Till, 1996).
The last, but not the least, the religious system is far from absent from the vaccine battlefield. The refusal of vaccines schedules is
often, in Africa especially, but in the USA as well (Belluz, 2019), based on religious creeds or precepts. One victim of the polarized
discussion on vaccines is a reasoned account of the trues misdeed of the pharma industry, (Goldacre, 2012; Rang, 2013) and a call to
the scientific community to“do a better job understanding why so many people are susceptible to false claims about vaccines, including
conspiracy theories centered on alleged greed” (Dreger, 2016). This is the climate of ‘vaccine exceptionalism’ whereby any doubter is an
anti-vaxxer, - not to say a “dangerous idiot”- and which, by denying the legitimacy of doubts about any aspect of Pharma behaviour,
may in fact contribute to the present problem (Dreger, 2015). Finally, as with other divisive issues such as gun control, the perverse
role of intentional pollution of the vaccine discussion with a disinformation campaign operated by Russians trolls – far from being a
science fiction script, is an acknowledged phenomenon (Broniatowski et al., 2018).
8. Lessons from the vaccination case
A Luhmannian analysis: the perception of vaccines from danger to risk
The vaccination controversy has all the characteristics of an autopoietic social system where communications connect to each
other on the opposition or contradictory mode (no-no); in other words to what Luhmann analyses as social conflict (Luhmann, 1995;
Taekke, 2017).
The government, the biological technoscience and the health system - what (Kirkland, 2016) calls the ‘immunization social order’
– on one side argue that vaccines are safe, that parents must trust them and vaccinate their children. On the other side, some parents
answer “No. We don’t trust you. Vaccines can cause autism. Science has given evidences of the link”. To which the ‘immunization
social order’ replies: “No. Science (now) has shown that it is not the case”. The problem is “What science should be trusted?”, the one
which finds a link or the one that contends there is no link? People suspect that the existence of the link is established by “genuine”
science and that it is technoscience that negates it because of its (too) close connections (couplings) with the immunization social
order.
The parasitism of science by technoscience and the blurring of the distinction between “knowing” interests and “doing “interests
has changed the conditions under which one can grant confidence or trust to what the media and society in general characterize as
scientific. There was a time when confidence in science could be safely assumed. This time is not totally over but the fact that science
has been subsumed by technoscience has changed the way the question is now addressed. Now, the question is to trust or distrust it.
What distinguishes confidence from trust is the fact the first attitude is passive and irreflexive while the latter is reflexive and active.
We “decide” to trust or to distrust. On the contrary, we “are” confident or not (Luhmann, 1988 pp.94–107).
The image of science in the public was that of a purely disinterested, cognitive activity steered only by the norms and values
described by Robert K. Merton (Merton, 1973). The importance of technoscience and its exposition in the medias has changed this.
The health system’ s image has also changed, and for the same reasons. Here also, we have gone from a confident attitude to a “trust
or distrust one”.
There is nothing irrational in parents being cautious about jabbing their child with products from technoscience and pharma-
ceutical companies even if – or especially if – it means disobeying the government. First of all, they know intuitively that:
The decisive distinction that determines the form “technology” is now that between controllable and uncontrollable states of affairs. To put
it in extremely abstract terms, it is a question of the successful reduction of complexity. Whatever else might happen, technology supplies the
intended results. However, we also know, […] that complexity itself can be captured in no reduction, can be represented in no model. Even
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if it works, we must also expect something to be left over. “Successful” reduction thus amounts to harmless ignoring.
(Luhmann, 1997, p.317). The problem is that even if at a population level, vaccination schedules - ignoring some complexity, can
be relatively harmless and fulfil utilitarian ethical precepts, it can be harmful at the individual one. Indeed, vaccines can cause
injuries and this is precisely why a special court has been settled in the US to deal legally with these cases.
Parents face nowadays the issue of vaccination of their children not anymore as a danger but as a risk. The distinction between
danger and risk has been introduced by Luhmann in his essay on risk (Luhmann, 1993 p. 147), (Taekke, 2017). In brief, danger is the
possible harm one can endure irrespective of one’s own decisions or behaviours, such as with natural disasters or harmful con-
sequences of others’ decisions. Risk concerns the possible harmful consequences of one’s own decisions and behaviours. When people
were confident in science and medicine, the possible damages resulting from medical errors, or a vaccination with complications,
were seen as dangers they had to consider, or as possible but inevitable accidents. But now that there is no more confidence, but trust
or distrust, the vaccination of their children has become a risk. Parents must decide if they trust the immunization social order or not.
It is up to them to take which risk for their child. If they hesitate or want to find social support for a decision not to trust, they can look
into the social networks and join communities of “distrusters” or listen to more balanced voices– those who do not absolve Pharma
but still behave responsibly in relation to vaccination, often depending on the cultural status of the parent. In this overheated setting
the industry’s strategy of producing ever newer vaccines and mixes of vaccines contributes to aliment suspicion and controversy
(Larson et al., 2011).
Indeed, the relationship between politics and the bio-technology of vaccines follow the general path described by Luhmann in
these terms:
“Since from the structural point of view technology is a simplification necessary for successful operation, and since it must for this reason
disregard actual, to say nothing of possible, causalities, politics has in this field to expect permanent, constantly repeated perturbations.
Seek and ye shall find! To this extent there is a structural affinity between technology and politics in the sense of a mutual reproduction
context - in which politics cannot avoid approving technology and thus providing itself with a source of perturbation.”
(Luhmann, 1993), p.147.
9. The temptation of techno-science
Science: an innocence lost or a new awareness?
It is indeed very tempting to make use of scientific methods, techniques and theories to raise and answer work/doesn’t work
questions instead of true/untrue ones. In other words, as Karl Marx asserts in his 11th thesis on Feuerbach, to try to change the world
rather than to interpret it. Admittedly, for most scientists nowadays it is not just a temptation but a sine que non.
It is almost impossible to find subsidies for true/untrue questions research, especially in disciplines such as chemistry, economics,
sociology, biology and so forth. In economics, for instance, almost all articles and books presented as “science” are actually “techno-
science”, devoted to making markets function, profits accumulate and growth be assured, be it at the macro or at the micro (the
business enterprise) levels. An important part of what is published under sociology consists in criticizing the world society for not
being faithful to the values it claims to embody; the remaining addresses “social problems”, trying to discover (or uncover) what
could be efficient against poverty, injustice, unemployment, criminality, etc., which is pure techno-science even if rather power-
lessness.
There is nothing wrong with trying to be pragmatically helpful, provided the two aims and the two endeavours are clearly
distinguished and that techno-science is clearly presented for what it is. In the social, political and economic domain, it means also
acknowledging that “changing the world” or even “solving social problems” is not science’s first function, let alone privilege, but
politicians and citizens’ s task, with the help of scientists if they can, and under the authority of the “demos”. This is the credo of
“Post-Normal” and Deweyan inspired experts. However, one can satisfy oneself with trying only to understand somewhat better the
world in which we are thrown,
In discussing “Paradoxes in science and law” (King & Schütz, 1994) note how science’s autopoiesis contains – as for all other
systems, elements of paradox and improbability.
… since modernity, [science] has tended to assume the function of determining 'truth' for society. The code, which governs its internal
operations and by which science constructs the external environment, is that of 'true/false' or 'true/not true. Science, therefore, distin-
guishes itself from its environment by the specificity and uniqueness of its identity, yet since any communication is subjected by science to
science's coding (or selectivity), how can science be sure that its claim to be capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood is in fact 'true'?
The claim rests entirely on science's construction of an environment in which it itself appears as capable of making such judgments of truth
and falsehood.
The authors go on to note how for science, as is the case of law, a loss of epistemic authority is obtained when a system is
perceived to deviate from its own code in favour of that – say, of the economy or media. Science can attempt an escape from the
strictures of the binary distinction truth/false into that of scientifically proved/scientifically unproved, or into attempts to distinguish
what is 'science' from what is 'non science’, as suggested by Karl Popper (Popper, 1959). (King & Schütz, 1994) warn the positivistic
scientist eager to have science having an impact in human affair to literally forget about whether Luhmann is right or wrong – we
would say forgetting Luhmann altogether. Yet thse authors subscribe to, and praise, Luhmann’s “ambitious modesty” whereby ex-
planation and prognosis are replaced by a modest-and-yet-ambitious effort of description. We shall be contented to have remained
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within these remits in the present work.
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